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I. INTRODUCTION 
Howell v. Howell1 is a statutory interpretation case in which the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Uniformed Services 
Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA)2 preempts a state court 
from ordering a retired servicemember to indemnify3 a former 
spouse for a reduction in their share of the retiree’s military pension 
when the retiree elects to receive disability compensation from the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), resulting in the waiver of an 
equal amount of military retired pay.4 The veteran’s reimbursement 
to the former spouse of monies waived for VA disability 
compensation is known as indemnification. By way of background, a 
retired servicemember may only receive VA disability compensation 
if he or she waives an equal amount of military retired pay.5 This is 
referred to as a VA waiver. Military retired pay is taxable, whereas VA 
disability compensation is not.6 The waived retired pay is restored 
(and thus, indemnification is not necessary) when the veteran has a 
VA disability rating of 50% or more and is receiving Concurrent 
1. 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017).
2. Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408
(1982). 
3. See BRETT R. TURNER, 2 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 6.10 (3d ed.
2017) [hereinafter EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION] (defining “indemnity” as “a limited 
theory, applying only to one particular type of benefit outside the scope of the 
USFSPA: military retirement benefits waived to acquire military disability benefits, 
veteran’s disability benefits, or civil service retirement benefits”). 
4. See Keith Berkshire, Howell, How a Unanimous Supreme Court Overturned 27
States’ Indemnification Laws for Military Disability, AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS., 
http://aaml.org/library/newsletter/howell-how-unanimous-supreme-court-overtu 
rned-27-states%E2%80%99-indemnification-laws-mil [https://perma.cc/M8P5/2K 
XF] (last visited June 20, 2018); Mark E. Sullivan, The Death of Indemnification, LEGAL
ASSISTANCE FOR MIL. PERSONNEL, N.C. STATE BAR [hereinafter The Death of 
Indemnification], http://www.nclamp.gov/publications/silent-partners/the-death-o 
f-indemnification/ [https://perma.cc/ME4B-A6VP] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
5. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5304–05 (2012).
6. Id. § 5301(a)(1).
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Retirement and Disability Pay (CRDP)7—unless the veteran also 
elects Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC),8 as one 
cannot receive both.  
Howell overruled the way many state courts have analyzed 
indemnification. This Note serves as an analytical and practical 
resource for family law practitioners nationwide, as the cost of 
military divorce and malpractice claims are both on the rise. This 
Note begins by exploring the history of the relevant Supreme Court 
precedent, explaining the statutory framework of the USFSPA, and 
examining the historic split among the states.9 Following are the 
facts and procedural history of Howell.10 Next, this Note examines 
post-Howell interpretation lenses—including how the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals has overstated the impact and application of the 
Howell decision11—and discusses potential remedies to address the 
impact of Howell going forward.12 Finally, this Note concludes that 
Howell has an extremely narrow holding: federal law prevents a state 
court from adjudicating indemnification.13 Although the Howell 
ruling precludes a state court from ordering a retired 
servicemember to indemnify a former spouse in certain situations,14 
the Supreme Court previously ruled that res judicata is a defense to 
federal preemption regarding the division of military service 
benefits.15 The Court has yet to address whether an agreement that 
divides a preempted benefit (i.e., VA disability compensation) is 
enforceable.16 
II. HISTORY
This section explains the history of a narrow area of family law: 
military pension division incident to divorce. To understand this 
area of law, this section begins by exploring the history of the 
relevant Supreme Court precedent and explains the statutory 
7. 10 U.S.C. § 1414 (2012).
8. Id. § 1413a.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.C.5.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part V.
14. Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1405 (2017); see Berkshire, supra note 4;
The Death of Indemnification, supra note 4. 
15. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 586 n.5 (1989).
16. Id. at 587 n.6.
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framework of the USFSPA.17 It also provides a broad overview of the 
historic split among the states regarding indemnification and 
specifically touches on the history of indemnification in Minnesota.  
A. McCarty v. McCarty and the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ 
Protection Act 
In McCarty, the issue presented to the Court was whether, upon 
the dissolution of a marriage, federal law precludes a state court 
from dividing military retired pay pursuant to state community 
property (or equitable distribution) laws.18 The Supreme Court held 
that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution19 
prohibited state courts from doing so.20 In so holding, the Court 
reasoned that the division of military retired pay had the potential 
to disturb the objectives Congress endorsed when it designed the 
military retirement system.21 Those objectives were: (1) “to provide 
for the retired service member,” and (2) “to meet the personnel 
management needs of the active military forces.”22 
In response to the McCarty decision, Congress enacted the 
USFSPA, which took effect on February 1, 1983.23 The USFSPA 
authorizes state courts to treat “disposable retired pay” as marital (or 
community) property.24 Disposable retired pay is defined as “the 
total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled” less, among 
other things, any amount waived to receive tax-free VA disability 
compensation.25 The USFSPA applies to disposable retired pay that 
17. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012).
18. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 211 (1981).
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause establishes that the
Constitution and all federal laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution are the 
“supreme Law of the Land.” Id. 
20. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 220.
21. Id. at 233.
22. Id. at 232–33.
23. Act of Sept. 8, 1982, Pub. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730 (1982)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1984)). 
24. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2012).
25. Id. § 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii). Historically, a servicemember’s disposable retired
pay was generally gross pay less the VA waiver (if applicable), less any amount(s) 
owed to the United States government (if applicable), and less the cost of the 
Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) premium (if applicable). Id. The SBP is governed by 
sections 1447–55. Id. 
 The statutory definition of disposable retired pay was redefined in 
December 2016. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 
4
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is payable after June 25, 1981 (the day of the McCarty decision) and 
to court orders entered after that date.26 
The USFSPA provides state courts with the power to divide 
military retired pay incident to divorce; the statute does not, 
however, require that military retired pay be divided.27 The USFSPA 
also specifies that jurisdiction for military pension division is 
premised upon domicile, consent, or residence within the court’s 
territorial jurisdiction, except due to military assignment.28 The 
USFSPA provides that state courts can order the direct payment of 
pension division awards through the “designated agent”—currently 
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service or the Coast Guard Pay 
and Personnel Center—when there are at least ten years of marriage 
overlapping at least ten years of creditable military service.29   
Although the USFSPA says a great deal about the payment of 
retired pay in compliance with court orders, it does not explain how 
114-328, § 641, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016); 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B)(i) (defining “total 
monthly retired pay” (available for division) as “the amount of basic pay payable to 
the member for the member’s pay grade and years of service at the time of the court 
order”). 
 This means that the disposable retired pay is a hypothetical amount frozen 
at the servicemembers’ rank and years, or points, as of the date of divorce. See U.S. 
Dep’t of Def., Reg. 7000.14-R, DOD Financial Management Regulation, vol. 7B, ch. 
29, para. 2908 (June 2017), http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/ 
documents/fmr/Volume_07b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NXQ-XVT5]; see also Mark 
E. Sullivan & Kaitlin S. Kober, Military Pension Division: The Frozen Benefit Rule, FAM.
LAW. MAG. (Sept. 1, 2017), http://familylawyermagazine.com/articles/frozen-
benefit-rule/ [https://perma.cc/BLF2-J3K9] (“On December 23, 2016 Congress 
passed The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA 17) 
which dramatically altered how military pension division orders are written. Instead 
of allowing the states to decide how to divide military retired pay, Congress imposed 
a single uniform method of pension division on all the states, a fictional scenario in 
which the military member retires on the day that the judgment of divorce is 
entered. This new rule up-ends the law regarding military pension division in almost 
every state.”). 
26. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587 (1989).
27. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (stating that state courts can treat “disposable retired
or retainer pay . . . either as property solely of the member or as property of the 
member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court”). 
The USFSPA prohibits a state court from forcing a servicemember “to apply for 
retirement or retire at a particular time.” Id. § 1408(c)(3). 
28. Id. § 1408(c)(4).
29. Id. §1408(d)(2). Generally, direct payments may not exceed 50% of the
servicemember’s disposable retired pay. Id. § 1408(e)(1). Additionally, these direct 
payments cease upon the death of the servicemember or former spouse (whichever 
occurs first). Id. § 1408(d)(4). 
5
Lynch: A Change in Military Pension Division: The End of Court-Adjudicat
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
2018] MILITARY PENSIONS & FEDERAL PREEMPTION 1069 
to divide military retired pay or how to draft a Military Pension 
Division Order (MPDO).30 There is no magic formula in the USFSPA 
that tells a family law practitioner what share of the servicemember’s 
military retired pay, if any, the former spouse should receive because 
divorce and property division are state law issues.31 More 
importantly, the USFSPA does not automatically entitle a former 
spouse to a share of the servicemember’s retired pay.32 It also does 
not prevent a court from awarding family support (e.g., child 
support, alimony or maintenance) from military retired pay.33 
B. Mansell v. Mansell 
Six years after the enactment of the USFSPA, the Supreme 
Court examined the definition of “disposable retired pay.”34 In 
Mansell, the parties signed a property settlement agreement that was 
later incorporated into a divorce decree.35 The settlement divided a 
portion of the former servicemember’s military retired pay that he 
waived to receive VA disability compensation.36 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court held that because the USFSPA expressly excluded 
VA disability compensation from the definition of disposable retired 
pay, military retired pay waived to receive VA disability benefits may 
not be treated as marital/community property.37 Thus, VA disability 
compensation is separate (nonmarital) property.38  
30. Since military retired pay is a federal entitlement under Title 10 of the
United States Code rather than a retirement plan, a Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order (QDRO) is improper to effectuate the division. MARK E. SULLIVAN, MILITARY
DIVORCE HANDBOOK 485 (ABA 2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter MILITARY DIVORCE
HANDBOOK]. A properly worded Military Pension Division Order is the correct 





34. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
35. Id. at 585.
36. Id. at 586.
37. Id. at 594–95.
38. Id. (holding “that the Former Spouses’ Protection Act does not grant state
courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay 
that has been waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits”). 
6
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Selitsch v. Selitsch,39 a case decided by the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals, provides an excellent discussion of the full history of the 
Mansell decision:  
A careful review of Mansell reveals that the United States 
Supreme Court did not preclude spouses from 
contractually agreeing to divide non-disposable retired pay. 
In Mansell, the husband’s original petition with the trial 
court asserted grounds for relief including: (1) that the 
USFSPA prevented state courts from treating his disability 
benefits as community property; and (2) federal law 
prevented courts from giving effect to parties’ contractual 
assignment of military benefits. The wife responded that, 
even if the husband’s contentions were true, res judicata 
prevented a collateral attack on the final divorce decree. 
The California courts denied the husband’s petition for 
relief, holding that federal law permitted state courts to 
treat disability benefits as community property. As 
discussed above, the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed, holding that the USFSPA prevents a court from 
considering non-disposable retired pay as community 
property during a divorce. Importantly, though, the 
Supreme Court did not consider the merits of the 
husband’s contract argument or the wife’s res judicata 
argument, and decided the case solely on USFSPA 
grounds. Thus, Mansell cannot be read to preclude 
enforcement of a parties’ contractual agreement to divide 
military funds that fall outside of the USFSPA’s definition 
of “disposable retired pay.”40 
There are two key footnotes in Mansell: footnote five, discussing 
res judicata,41 and footnote six, discussing contractual 
indemnification.42 Res judicata is an exception to the general rule of 
Mansell43—military retired pay that has been waived to receive VA 
39. 492 S.W.3d 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a former husband was
not entitled to relief from a martial dissolution agreement based on a mutual 
mistake regarding military benefits). 
40. Id. at 686–87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
41. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 586 n.5 (1989).
42. Id. at 587 n.6.
43. Brett R. Turner, State Court Treatment of Military and Veteran’s Disability
Benefits: A 2004 Update, 16 DIVORCE LITIG. 76, 80 (2004) [hereinafter State Court 
Treatment]. 
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disability benefits may not be treated as marital/community 
property.44 Footnote five in the Mansell opinion states: 
In a supplemental brief, Mrs. Mansell argues that the 
doctrine of res judicata should have prevented this pre-
McCarty property settlement from being reopened. The 
California Court of Appeal, however, decided that it was 
appropriate, under California law, to reopen the 
settlement and reach the federal question. Whether the 
doctrine of res judicata, as applied in California, should 
have barred the reopening of pre-McCarty settlements is a 
matter of state law over which we have no jurisdiction. The 
federal question is therefore properly before us.45 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court approved the California state 
court’s division of VA disability compensation under a theory of res 
judicata.46 Res judicata is indisputably a matter of state law over 
which the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction.47 Footnote five in the 
Mansell opinion “expressly permits division [of waived military 
retired pay] under the law of res judicata.”48 Brett R. Turner49 
explains that the post-remand denial of certiorari in Mansell50 is an 
explicit refusal by the Supreme Court to reverse state court orders 
holding that division of preempted benefits are final and cannot be 
44. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594–95.
45. Id. at 586 n.5 (citations omitted).
46. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9 (“[T]he United States
Supreme Court has twice expressly stated . . . that state courts can divide military 
benefits under a theory of res judicata.”); State Court Treatment, supra note 43 (“[T]he 
benefits at issue were divided in a property settlement agreement, which was 
incorporated into the divorce decree. When an agreement is incorporated into the 
decree, it becomes for all purposes a term of the decree, just as if set forth therein.”). 
47. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9; State Court Treatment, supra
note 43. 
48. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9 (“A minority of state court
decisions hold that division on the basis of res judicata is not permitted, generally 
on the basis that state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to divide any military 
benefits outside the USFSPA on any theory at all.”); see, e.g., State Court Treatment, 
supra note 43. 
49. Brett R. Turner “is the author of the leading national treatise on equitable
distribution, Equitable Distribution of Property (3d ed. 2005), and is a nationally known 
expert in the law of equitable distribution.” Senior Research Attorney Brett R. Turner, 
NAT’L LEGAL RESEARCH GRP., INC., http://www.nlrg.com/our-attorneys/brett-r-
turner [https://perma.cc/E3YP-5LPA] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
50. Mansell v. Mansell, 498 U.S. 806 (1990).
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reopened, and therefore not void.51 Turner further explains that in 
addition to Mansell: 
The Supreme Court held one other time that res judicata 
is a defense to federal preemption regarding the division 
of military service benefits. In a case decided shortly after 
McCarty, the courts of California expressly and directly 
held that McCarty did not prevent the division of military 
retirement benefits on a theory of res judicata. A petition 
for certiorari was filed, but the Supreme Court dismissed it 
for want of a substantial federal question. Dismissal for 
want of a substantial federal question is an adjudication on 
the merits. Like footnote 5 in Mansell, the dismissal of 
certiorari is precedential authority from the Supreme 
Court permitting division on a theory of res judicata.52 
Thus, a “division [of preempted benefits] on the basis of res judicata 
is so strongly permitted that it lies outside federal appellate 
jurisdiction.”53 
Footnote six in the Mansell opinion reserved the question of 
whether an agreement that divides a preempted benefit (i.e., 
veteran’s disability benefits) is enforceable.54 Footnote six in the 
Mansell opinion states: 
Because we decide that the Former Spouses’ Protection Act 
precludes States from treating as community property 
retirement pay waived to receive veterans’ disability 
benefits, we need not decide whether the anti-attachment 
clause, §3101(a), independently protects such pay.55 
To date, this question has not been addressed by the United States 
Supreme Court.56  
C. State Split 
Prior to Howell, more than 60% of the states held that Mansell 
and the USFSPA did not apply to post-divorce VA waivers of military 
51. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9.
52. State Court Treatment, supra note 43 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 83.
54. See id.; see also Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587 n.6.
55. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587 n.6.
56. Id.; EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.11 (citing Rose v. Rose, 481
U.S. 619 (1987) (stating the case that comes the closest to addressing this issue is 
Rose v. Rose, as it “suggests that the Supreme Court might well hold that a contractual 
assignment of military benefits to a family member of the veteran is not prohibited 
by the anti-assignment clause”); see State Court Treatment, supra note 43, at 80. 
9
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retired pay and that indemnification was permitted.57 Although a few 
states had mixed authority on the subject, the conflicting case law 
could generally be distinguished by the underlying facts, such as 
whether the former spouse was awarded a share of the military 
pension by consent (e.g., separation agreement or consent order) or 
57. Stone v. Stone, 26 So. 3d 1232 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); Young v. Lowery, 221
P.3d 1006 (Alaska 2009); Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257 (Alaska 1992); In re 
Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017); In re 
Falkow, No. 2 CA-CV 2012-0096, 2013 WL 485678 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2013); In 
re Marriage of Krempin, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); In re Marriage 
of Warkocz, 141 P.3d 926 (Colo. App. 2006); Getka v. Getka, No. 
KNOFA074107032S, 2010 WL 625791 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2010); Blann v. 
Blann, 971 So. 2d 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Jaylo v. Jaylo, 248 P.3d 1219 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 2011); Perez v. Perez, 110 P.3d 409 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005); Bienvenue v. 
Bienvenue, 72 P.3d 531 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003); McHugh v. McHugh, 861 P.2d 113 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1993); In re Marriage of Neilsen & Magrini, 792 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2003); Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); In re 
Marriage of Carlson, No. 13-1854, 2015 WL 576014 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015); 
In re Marriage of Gahagen, 690 N.W.2d 695 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004); Black v. Black, 
842 A.2d 1280 (Me. 2004); Pere v. Pere, No. 2279, 2016 WL 4415360 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. Aug. 19, 2016); Wilson v. Wilson, 117 A.3d 138 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015); 
Dziamko v. Chuhaj, 996 A.2d 893 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); Allen v. Allen, 941 
A.2d 510 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Dexter v. Dexter, 661 A.2d 171 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1995); Krapf v. Krapf, 786 N.E.2d 318 (Mass. 2003); McGee v. Carmine, 802 
N.W.2d 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010); Gatfield v. Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2004); Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507 (Nev. 2003); Hodgins v. Hodgins, 497 
A.2d 1187 (N.H. 1985); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 862 A.2d 1187 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2004); Torwich v. Torwich, 660 A.2d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); 
Scheidel v. Scheidel, 4 P.3d 670 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); Bagley v. Bagley, No. 2010-
CA-17, 2011 WL 944190 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2011); Hodge v. Hodge, 197 P.3d 
511 (Okla. Civ. App. 2008); Hayes v. Hayes, 164 P.3d 1128 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007); 
In re Marriage of Hayes, 208 P.3d 1046 (Ore. Ct. App. 2009); Morgante v. Morgante, 
119 A.3d 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015); Hayward v. Hayward, 868 A. 2d 554 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2005); Resare v. Resare, 908 A.2d 1006 (R.I. 2006); Hisgen v. Hisgen, 554 N.W.2d 
494 (S.D. 1996); Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892 (Tenn. 2001); Selitsch v. 
Selitsch, 492 S.W.3d 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015); Pederson v. Pederson, Nos. 1178-
15-4, 2093-15-4, 2016 WL 4088875 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016); Jones v. Jones, No. 
0062-15-2, 2016 WL 389492 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2016); Poziombke v. Poziombke, 
No. 1150-05-1, 2006 WL 325296 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2006); Hubble v. Hubble, No. 
2015-01-4, 2002 WL 1809078 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2002); Owen v. Owen, 419 S.E.2d 
267 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); In re Marriage of Ocasio-Santiago & Rockwood, 198 Wash. 
App. 1026 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017); see Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act in State Court Divorce 
Proceedings, 59 A.L.R.6th 433 (2015). 
10
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by adjudication.58 Only a small minority of states did not permit 
indemnification.59 
1. Minnesota
Historically, Minnesota has been a pro-indemnification state. 
In Gatfield v. Gatfield,60 the parties included the following 
indemnification clause in their stipulated Virginia dissolution 
judgement: 
58. See Copas v. Copas, 359 S.W.3d 471 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (holding a former
husband’s military disability benefits were not subject to division as marital property 
in post-dissolution proceeding, even though husband’s election to receive the 
disability benefits reduced former wife’s share of husband’s “disposable military 
retired pay”); Morgan v. Morgan, 249 S.W.3d 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Tirado v. 
Tirado, 530 S.E.2d 128 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000); Wright v. Wright, 594 So. 2d 1139 (La. 
Ct. App. 1992). 
 Compare Surratt v. Surratt, 148 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that the veteran was obligated to pay the former spouse her full share of 
retired pay, regardless of whether the veteran continued to draw “disposable retired 
pay” as defined in the USFSPA), with Ashley v. Ashley, 990 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Ark. 
1999) (holding that under the USFSPA, the former spouse was no longer entitled 
to the amount awarded in the divorce because the veteran’s disposable retired pay 
was reduced due to a VA waiver). 
 Compare Hillard v. Hillard, 733 S.E.2d 176, 180–81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) 
(holding that a judge can require reimbursement if a VA waiver comes into play 
post-divorce), with Halstead v. Halstead, 596 S.E.2d 353, 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that a judge cannot order indemnification at the outset), and White v. 
White, 568 S.E.2d 283, 286 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a judge can adjust 
former spouse’s share of military pension if veteran elects disability). But see Parker 
v. Parker, No. 2012-CA-000079-MR, 2013 WL 2359661 (Ky. Ct. App. May 31, 2013);
Wilson v. Wilson, Nos. 2004-CA-000276-MR & 2004-CA-001648-MR, 2005 WL 
2398020 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2005); Carpenter v. Carpenter, No. 2004-CA-001270-
MR, 2005 WL 1415554 (Ky. Ct. App. June 17, 2005) (holding that the trial court 
correctly ruled the wife was entitled to entitled to enforcement of the separation 
agreement but could not order division of husband’s disability benefits); Ast v. Ast, 
162 So. 3d 720 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Strassner v. Strassner, 895 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
59. Geesaman v. Geesaman, CK92-3641, 92-7-30-DIV, 1993 WL 777094 (Del.
Fam. Ct. 1993); In re Marriage of Pierce, 982 P.2d 995 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); Mallard 
v. Burkart, 95 So. 3d 1264 (Miss. 2012); Kramer v. Kramer, 567 N.W.2d 100 (Neb.
1997); Newman v. Newman, 248 A.D.2d 990 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Hagen v. Hagen, 
282 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. 2009); Youngbluth v. Youngbluth, 6 A.3d 677 (Vt. 2010); 
Gillin v. Gillin, 307 S.W.3d 395 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009). 
60. 682 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), overruled by Mattson v. Mattson, 903
N.W.2d 233, 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
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Husband covenants, represents, warrants and agrees that 
he will not waive any portion of any longevity retired, 
retirement or retainer pay in order to elect disability or 
other pension or lump sum or severance pay or other 
compensation in lieu thereof and agrees to renounce the 
right to make such waiver and election and to elect an 
alternative form of retirement. In the event husband does 
in violation hereof, he shall upon receipt pay to wife fifty 
percent (50%) thereof.61 
The husband later elected to receive disability benefits and 
“waived an equivalent portion of his military retirement pay.”62 The 
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the USFSPA and Mansell 
did not prohibit a retired servicemember from voluntarily entering 
into a contract precluding the waiver of military retired pay in favor 
of disability benefits and requiring indemnification for the former 
spouse for any loss resulting from such a waiver.63 The court further 
noted that “[i]t is well settled that in a stipulation, parties are free to 
bind themselves to obligations that a court could not impose.”64  
Just five months after the Howell decision, the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals, in Mattson v. Mattson, overruled Gatfield and held that 
federal law preempts state courts from dividing a veteran’s VA 
disability compensation as marital property and rendered such 
property divisions unenforceable, even if they had been agreed 
upon.65 The primary issue before the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
was whether federal law preempts enforcement of the portion of the 
parties’ stipulated decree that divided the retired servicemember’s VA 
disability compensation.66 The court concluded that “[VA] disability 
compensation is not among the military benefits that may be divided 
as marital property, and states are preempted from enforcing such 
divisions.”67 This holding is further examined in Part IV of this Note. 
61. Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d at 634–35.
62. Id. at 635.
63. Id. at 636.
64. Id. at 637.
65. Mattson v. Mattson, 903 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), petition for
review denied, (Minn. Dec. 27, 2017). 
66. Id. at 263.
67. Id. at 241.
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III. THE HOWELL DECISION
The Howell case is a landmark decision in family law. It sets a 
precedent that only a minority of states previously approved.68 It is 
crucial to understand the underlying facts in Howell because they lay 
the foundation for its narrow holding. Without this clear 
understanding, one cannot properly apply Howell or distinguish it 
from seemingly comparable cases.  
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Mr. and Mrs. Howell divorced in Arizona in 1991.69 The Decree 
of Dissolution awarded Mrs. Howell 50% of Mr. Howell’s military 
pension.70 There was no underlying separation agreement or 
consent between the parties containing an express indemnification 
clause. Mr. Howell retired from the Air Force in 1992 and began 
receiving military retried pay.71 In 2005, he elected VA disability 
compensation resulting from a 20% VA disability rating.72 The 
resulting VA waiver reduced his former wife’s 50% share by about 
$125 per month.73  
The former wife sought enforcement of the original decree in 
Arizona family court.74 The decree did not contain an 
indemnification clause; it only awarded 50% of the military 
pension.75 Thus, the former wife’s enforcement action was not based 
on a prior agreement or a prior adjudication by the court (which 
would have amounted to res judicata) for the retiree to indemnify 
her. The trial court ordered Mr. Howell to indemnify his former wife 
and awarded arrears,76 and Mr. Howell appealed.77 The Arizona 
68. Supra note 59 and accompanying text.




73. Id. By way of illustration, the veteran “consequently had to waive about $250
per month of the roughly $1,500 of military retirement pay he shared with [his 
former spouse]. Doing so reduced the amount of retirement pay that he and [his 




77. In re Marriage of Howell, No. 2 CA-CV 2014-0112, 2014 WL 7236856 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2014), vacated, In re Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2015). 
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Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling,78 and Mr. Howell 
appealed once more.79 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court’s judgment.80 Mr. Howell petitioned for review by the 
United States Supreme Court.81 Given that state courts had reached 
different conclusions on the matter, the Supreme Court granted the 
veteran’s petition for certiorari,82 and reversed and remanded.83 
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The issue presented in Howell v. Howell was whether a state court 
can increase a former spouse’s pro rata share of military retired pay 
when a retiree waives military retired pay for nontaxable VA disability 
benefits post-divorce, thus causing a reduction in the former 
spouse’s share.84 Writing for the Court, Justice Stephen Breyer stated 
in the opinion that “[t]he question is complicated, but the answer is 
not.”85 The Court held that, “[a] state court may not order a veteran 
to indemnify a divorced spouse for the loss in the divorced spouse’s 
portion of the veteran’s retirement pay caused by the veteran’s 
waiver of retirement pay to receive service-related disability 
benefits.”86  
The Court reasoned that its decision in Mansell that “federal law 
completely pre-empts the States from treating waived military 
retirement pay as divisible community property,” determined the 
outcome of the case.87 The Arizona Supreme Court attempted to 
distinguish Mr. Howell’s case from Mansell by emphasizing that the 
VA waiver took place post-divorce, whereas in Mansell the VA waiver 
was already in place at the time of divorce.88 However, the Court 
stated that this was not significant.89 The Court opined that a state 
cannot “avoid Mansell by describing the family court order as an 
78. Howell, 2014 WL 7236856, at *1. Interestingly, the former spouse did not
even file a brief with the court of appeals. Id. 
79. See In re Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936 (Ariz. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct.
1400 (2017). 
80. Id. at 941.
81. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1401.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1402.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1401.
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order requiring [the veteran] to ‘reimburse’ or to ‘indemnify’ [the 
former spouse], rather than an order that divides property.”90 The 
Court further stated that: 
The principal reason the state courts have given for 
ordering reimbursement or indemnification is that they 
wish to restore the amount previously awarded as 
community property, i.e., to restore that portion of 
retirement pay lost due to the postdivorce waiver. And we 
note that here, the amount of indemnification mirrors the 
waived retirement pay, dollar for dollar. Regardless of their 
form, such reimbursement and indemnification orders 
displace the federal rule and stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the purposes and 
objectives of Congress. All such orders are thus 
preempted.91 
This holding is extremely narrow. It was not based on contract 
law, as there was no express indemnification clause involved. The 
Court’s examination of the USFSPA in Howell does not change the 
existing rules and precedents regarding express contract terms. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that federal law preempts a 
servicemember or veteran from knowingly and voluntarily 
negotiating and executing a contract that contains an express 
indemnification clause.92 Howell makes it clear that prospective 
indemnification orders are preempted by federal law and that an 
award of indemnity is reversible error. But it does not address 
whether a prior un-appealed order awarding indemnity is void, or 
whether an agreement or consent order containing an express 
indemnification clause is enforceable.93  
Howell is distinguishable from Mansell because it involved a 
timely appeal from an adjudication of indemnity, whereas Mansell 
involved a divorce decree that incorporated the parties’ property 
settlement agreement that divided non-disposable retired pay.94 
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1406.
92. See, e.g., Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507, 511 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 960 (2004) (holding that state courts are not precluded from applying contract 
law when disability benefits are involved). 
93. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.10 (discussing the significance
of footnote six in Mansell). 
94. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 585–86 (1989); see McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210, 218 (1981); In re Marriage of Howell, 361 P.3d 936, 936 (Ariz. 2015). 
McCarty, like Howell, was also based on an adjudication, not an agreement. 453 U.S. 
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Howell did not consider the question left unanswered in Mansell—
whether the parties can contract to waive a federal preemption 
objection.95 A post-Howell state court has no authority to adjudicate 
an indemnification provision.96 Accordingly, a servicemember is 
unlikely to agree to such a provision. 
The Court recognized the potential harm done by the Howell 
decision: a VA waiver could diminish or completely wipe out a 
former spouse’s entire share of the military pension. Accordingly, 
Justice Breyer proposed two options that state courts can take to 
avoid that harm.97 First, a state court can “take account of the 
contingency that some military retirement pay might be waived.”98 
The Court did not, however, appear to consider the possibility that 
a future waiver of retired pay does not affect the present value.99 
Second, a state court can “take account of reductions in value when 
it calculated or recalculates the need for spousal support.”100 Yet, the 
Court did not appear to consider the possibility that support can be 
waived or not claimed, or that a party could be barred from claiming 
support by fault, by being a non-dependent spouse, by cohabitating, 
or by remarrying. Justice Breyer’s proposed remedies are further 
discussed below. 
IV. ANALYSIS
This section begins by discussing the potential remedies 
addressed in the Howell opinion and the potential problems with 
those remedies. It then discusses alternative remedies to address the 
impact of Howell going forward. Next, this section examines post-
Howell interpretation lenses—the ways in which various state courts 
have interpreted and applied Howell—including how the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals has overstated the impact and application of the 
decision. Finally, it addresses the public policy implications of Howell. 
at 217–18. 
95. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587 n.6.
96. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1401.
97. Id. at 1406.
98. Id.
99. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9.
100. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1406. 
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A. Justice Breyer’s Proposed Remedies 
The Court proposed two steps a state court can take to avoid the 
potential harm Howell may cause when dividing property during a 
divorce case: (1) to “take account of the contingency that some 
military retirement pay might be waived,” and (2) to “take account 
of reductions in value when it calculates or recalculates the need for 
spousal support.”101 Both of these proposed remedies pose potential 
problems.  
1. Factor into Valuation/Distribution
First, the Court failed to address the possibility that a potential, 
future waiver of retired pay does not affect its present value.102 By 
way of illustration, a house or 401(k) plan are worth a specific 
amount—a house can simply be appraised, and a 401(k) statement 
reflects its value.  However, determining the value of a military 
pension is much more complex and requires the involvement of an 
expert, usually a Certified Public Accountant or actuary.103 How 
could an expert determine the probability of a servicemember 
receiving a service-connected disability? What is the equation to 
compute this? How are factors such as the branch of service (e.g., 
Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force, Army), active duty versus 
Guard/Reserve status, and general job nature (e.g., combat, legal, 
intelligence, communications, etc.) taken into account? It is just not 
possible. Maybe the Court meant that the state court can value the 
military pension and make a present-value award. 
Initially, the Court seemingly confused the distinction between 
valuation and the actual division of property.104 Considering a 
potential future election of VA disability compensation as a property 
division factor is like trying to provide a cash award to compensate 
in advance for the harm done to a vehicle in a car accident, knowing 
in advance that only some vehicles will be involved in a collision and 
the amount of damage is not predictable.105 Considering a future 
election of VA disability compensation as a factor of division is not a 
reliable or adequate solution. 
101. Id. 
102. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.10. 
103. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., VALUATION OF THE
MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM (2008). 
104. See EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.10. 
105. See id. (offering an analogous scenario involving a tornado). 
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2. Spousal Support/Alimony
Second, the Court failed to consider many intertwined variables 
pertaining to spousal support. A state court cannot predict whether 
the harm (i.e., election of VA disability compensation) will occur 
and, if so, to what extent (i.e., if the former spouse’s share is 
minimally reduced or completely diminished). Even so, on the 
surface level, this spousal support option seems slightly more viable 
than factoring a potential, future waiver of retired pay into 
valuation/distribution.106 To illustrate, when a retired 
servicemember elects VA disability compensation and there is no 
agreement or final order, a state court cannot award indemnity.107 It 
could, however, order the retired servicemember to pay additional 
spousal support.108 While this solution seems reasonable, there are 
many questions that should be considered. For example, what if the 
VA waiver occurs at or before the setting of spousal support? What if 
the former spouse has remarried? What if the former spouse was 
barred by fault grounds from claiming spousal support? What if the 
former spouse was not a dependent spouse? What if state law 
includes rigid limitations on spousal support? What if the divorce 
occurred years ago and there was no claim for spousal support? 
Since the Court has specifically listed spousal support as a 
remedy, it is imperative that the state court retain authority and 
reserve jurisdiction over spousal support after the divorce, as 
permissible by state law. Spousal support is governed by state law, so 
this remedy will vary substantially by state.109 In many states, the 
issues of spousal support and property division are separate and 
distinct—there is no across-the-board solution.110 In fact, at least one 
state has refused to allow an award of alimony as a remedy in a case 
regarding the election of VA disability compensation.111 
106. See id. 
107. Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1401 (2017). 
108. See Family Law in the Fifty States 2015–2016: Charts, 50 FAM. L. Q. 566, 566–
69 (2017) (containing a chart showing the pertinent statutes and applicable factors 
in all fifty states). 
 109. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 586–87 (1989) (“Casas held that after the 
passage of the Former Spouses’ Protection Act, federal law no longer pre-empted 
state community property law as it applies to military retirement pay.”). 
 110. See In re Marriage of Cassinelli, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 111. Id. (holding that “the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy 
for the loss of a community property interest”), vacated and remanded, Cassinelli v. 
Cassinelli, 138 S. Ct. 69 (2017) (vacating and remanding the judgment for further 
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B. Potential Remedies 
Military benefits, such as military retired pay, are governed by 
federal law. On the contrary, property division incident to divorce is 
a matter of state law, and the granting of military retired pay is 
implemented through a state court order.112 However, the approval 
or denial regarding receipt of the benefit is determined by the 
federal government (i.e., the retired pay center determines military 
retired pay eligibility). Thus, “military benefits are creatures of 
federal law, and the treatment of military benefits in state divorce 
proceedings has been a source of federal and state tension for 
decades.”113 This illustrates that viable remedies will vary by state. 
There are five potential remedies that pertain to the issue of 
indemnification. 
1. Alimony/Spousal Support
The first potential remedy, as proposed by Justice Breyer, is 
alimony/spousal support. Although VA disability benefits cannot be 
divided as marital/community property, they can be considered a 
source of income for purposes of alimony.114 As observed in Hurt v. 
Jones-Hurt, “the impact of Howell may in a particular case constitute a 
change in circumstances entitling a court to revisit an alimony 
award . . . whether or not the parties or the court were aware ex ante 
that a spouse could elect to waive pension payments for disability 
benefits.”115 The problem lies with the timing of the alimony claim, 
whether alimony is waived, whether marital fault is relevant to 
alimony, and whether standard of living and reasonable needs are 
relevant to alimony. All of these factors may play a part and vary by 
state.116 
consideration in light of Howell). 
112. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 589. 
113. Hurt v. Jones-Hurt, 168 A.3d 992, 997 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017). 
114. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (2012); State Court Treatment, supra note 43, at 82 (“Disability 
benefits which cannot be divided under Mansell clearly can be considered as a 
source for alimony.”). “Where disability has not been elected at divorce, but an 
election is pending or otherwise seems likely, the court may make a nominal award 
or otherwise reserve jurisdiction to make an award of support after the election is 
final.” Id. at 83. On the contrary, “[w]here disability is elected after the divorce, the 
election of disability is a sufficient change of circumstance to permit an increase in 
alimony.” Id. 
115. Hurt, 168 A.3d at 1003. 
116. See Family Law in the Fifty States, supra note 108, at 566–69. 
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2. Res Judicata
The second potential remedy regarding indemnification and 
the division of waived military retired pay is the doctrine of res 
judicata. Res judicata is defined as, “a thing adjudicated. Once a 
lawsuit is decided, the same issue or an issue arising from the first 
issue cannot be contested again.”117 The Supreme Court has noted 
that “the res judicata consequences of a final, un-appealed judgment 
on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may 
have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently 
overruled in another case.”118 Accordingly, if military and/or 
disability benefits are divided in violation of Mansell (and now 
Howell), but the servicemember fails to timely appeal, the decision is 
final. Thus, the benefits at issue are lawfully and validly divided.119 
Moreover, courts around the country have uniformly held that 
McCarty and Mansell are not retroactive.120 Likewise, there is nothing 
in Howell that suggests that the Supreme Court intended to invalidate 
or otherwise render unenforceable prior valid judgments. 
117. Res judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910). 
 118. Federated Dep’t Stores Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (citing 
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947); Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter 
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Wilson’s Executor v. Deen, 121 U.S. 525, 534 
(1887)). 
119. See Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507 (Nev. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 960 
(2004) (stating federally preempted benefits can be divided on a theory of res 
judicata; relying expressly on the post-remand decision in Mansell); In re Marriage 
of Curis, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Evans v. Evans, 541 A.2d 648 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1988); In re Zrubek, 149 B.R. 631 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1993); EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.9. 
 120. See, e.g., In re Chandler, 805 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 
1049 (1987); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 696 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 933 (1983); Brown v. Robertson, 606 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Tex. 1985); Ford 
v. Ford, 783 S.W.2d 879 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990); Allcock v. Allcock, 437 N.E.2d 392 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1982); Toupal v. Toupal, 790 P.2d 1055 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); Baxter v. 
Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1990); In re Marriage of Reinauer, 946 S.W.2d 853 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1997), on reh’g in part, (May 22, 1997); Elliott v. Elliott, 797 S.W.2d 
388 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Berry v. Berry, 870 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), 
judgment rev’d, 786 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1990), writ granted, (Mar. 28, 1990); Maxwell v. 
Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra 
note 3, § 6.11. 
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3. Express Contractual Indemnification
Although res judicata provides a “defense to federal preemption 
regarding the division of military service benefits,”121 the question is 
whether federal law preempts agreements between parties. A 
common understanding of executed settlement agreements would 
suggest that “if an agreement dividing military or veteran’s disability 
benefits is incorporated into a decree, the agreement and the decree 
should be fully enforceable under state law principles of res 
judicata.”122 However, the status of an agreement that is not 
incorporated into a decree has not yet been resolved at the Supreme 
Court level.123 A state court does not need to treat a benefit as 
marital/community property in order to enforce a contract dividing 
it, as contracts dividing separate (nonmarital) property are 
universally enforceable under state law.124 
4. Extraordinary Remedy
Generally, property division incident to divorce is fixed and 
final, and cannot be reopened. However, exceptional circumstances 
may justify the reopening of a previously settled or adjudicated 
division of marital/community property. In many states, this remedy 
is governed by the statute governing relief from judgment or order. 
Alaska paved the way in Guerrero v. Guerrero, a case that held that 
the lower court abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the 
parties’ property settlement agreement and conduct a full equitable 
division analysis when the veteran’s disposable retired pay ended up 
being zero dollars.125 Although Guerrero was decided prior to Howell, 
its principal conclusion remains relevant: when a division of 
marital/community property is based on a fundamental assumption 
that the veteran’s military retired pay is divisible (and it is the parties’ 
primary asset), it is erroneous to deny relief when the former 
spouse’s share is completely offset due to the veteran’s receipt of 
disability benefits.126 Thus, although property division is generally 
121. State Court Treatment, supra note 43, at 80. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] former spouse’s right to enforce 
a contract with the service member also has a degree of constitutional protection.” 
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 6.11; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
125. Guerrero v. Guerrero, 362 P.3d 432, 445 (Alaska 2015). 
126. Id. at 444. Guerrero involved Military Disability Retired Pay (MDRP), which 
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fixed and final, a court may have discretion to reopen a division of 
marital/community property when extraordinary circumstances 
arise.   
5. Present Value Offset
The fifth potential remedy is to offset the present value of the 
military pension with an alternative asset, such as the marital 
residence. Generally, to divide marital/community property 
incident to divorce, it must be valued. Often, a military pension is 
not valued unless the case goes to trial because determining the 
value of a military pension is a complex task and requires the skills 
of an expert, which can be expensive. In cases where the 
servicemember is not yet retired, a present value offset award may be 
the answer for the soon-to-be-former spouse.127  
For example, an expert values the military pension, and its value 
at the date of classification is $800,000. Assume that 70% of the 
pension is marital. Accordingly, the former spouse’s one-half share 
is 35%, or approximately $280,000. The servicemember could keep 
the pension, and the former spouse could be compensated in the 
property distribution with an asset or assets of similar or equivalent 
value.   
The problem with this approach will be that the parties may not 
have an asset large enough to offset the former spouse’s share of the 
pension. Alternatively, using the example above, the state court 
could award spousal support in the amount of $2,000/month for 140 
months until the $280,000 is paid up. Determining the present value 
of the former spouse’s share, then awarding spousal support (non-
modifiable due to cohabitation or remarriage)128 for a set period 
is governed by 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1222 (2012).  MDRP, like VA disability 
compensation, is non-divisible retired pay. See Military Pension Division Order: 
“REJECTED,” SILENT PARTNER, ABA SECT. FAM. L., https://www.americanbar.org/c  
ontent/dam/aba/administrative/family_law/committees/rejected.authcheckdam
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZZ9-75MR] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
 127. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 615 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
However, valuing a military pension when the servicemember has less than twenty 
years of service comes with added complications. For example, the expert must 
account for and apply additional discount rates pertaining to the probability of 
reaching twenty years of service. Id. at 681. 
 128. Most states will not allow this method of calculating spousal support—
except by consent—as it is contrary to state statutes. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 518.552(6) (2017).
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until the total payout is equivalent to the present value share may be 
a more viable solution.129 
C. Post-Howell State Interpretation Lenses 
A handful of states have interpreted and applied the Howell 
decision at the state appellate level.   
1. Winters v. Winters
Winters v. Winters,130 an Illinois Court of Appeals case, was 
decided shortly after the Howell decision. Although Winters does not 
refer to Howell, it correctly applied the principles that Howell 
examined. Winters is distinguishable from Howell because it involved 
a consent order with an indemnification provision.131  
When the parties divorced in 2014 (pre-Howell), the husband, a 
retired servicemember, was receiving military retired pay and VA 
disability compensation.132 The court entered a judgment for 
dissolution of marriage that awarded the wife one-half of the 
retiree’s gross military retired pay and included an indemnification 
provision.133 The husband filed a timely motion for relief and argued 
that part of his military pension consisted of VA disability 
compensation that was not subject to division under the USFSPA.134 
Subsequently, the parties reached an agreement.135 The parties 
agreed that the 2014 judgment would remain in effect with the 
exception of the husband’s child support obligation, which was 
modified.136 The court entered an order incorporating this 
agreement in January 2015, which was not appealed.137 Soon after, 
in April 2015, the wife filed a petition for rule to show cause asserting 
 129. Email from Marshal S. Willick, Principal Attorney, Willick Law Grp., to 
Mark E. Sullivan, Principal Attorney, Sullivan & Tanner, P.A., et al. (Sept. 26, 2017, 
17:39 EST) (on file with author). 
130. No. 5-16-0217, 2017 WL 3276408 (Ill. App. Ct. July 31, 2017). 
131. Id. at *1. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. The indemnification provision required the husband “to pay Wife the 
difference between any money she would lose were Husband to opt for VA benefits, 
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that the husband was not making proper payments to her.138 In July 
2015, the parties entered into a consent order, which reduced the 
wife’s share of the military pension to $1,609.84 per month.139 The 
husband did not appeal.140  
In November 2015, the wife filed a motion to enforce, again 
asserting that the husband was not making proper payments to 
her.141 The husband again argued that part of the $1,609.84 he was 
required to pay was VA disability compensation.142 The court 
enforced the July 2015 consent order, and ordered him to pay the 
full amount.143 An appeal followed.144  
On appeal, the husband concurred that $2,210.47 of his military 
retired pay was attributable to VA disability compensation, which is 
excluded from disposable retired pay.145 He argued that his former 
spouse was only entitled to 50% of his disposable retired pay under 
the USFSPA.146 Although VA disability compensation is excluded 
from disposable retired pay, the husband ignored two other factors 
that applied in his case.147 First, the husband never appealed the 
original judgment awarding his former spouse one-half of gross 
military retired pay, nor did he appeal any subsequent order on the 
basis that a large portion of his military pension was attributable to 
VA disability compensation.148 Therefore, the doctrine of res 
judicata applies. 
Second, the husband agreed to pay his former spouse a certain 
amount.149 Although he could not be forced, he could still 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. Additionally, the husband did not file a motion for reconsideration. Id. 
141. Id. at *2. 
142. Id. According to the husband, one-half of his military retired pay was 
approximately $500 per month (since a VA wavier was in place), thus he was not 






148. Id. Furthermore, “Husband was the one who supplied the court with his 
retirement pay figures. Husband is the one who withdrew his motions to change the 
amount of support and/or chose not to pursue his arguments that a large portion 
of his retirement benefits could not be used in calculating the amount of support 
Wife could receive.” Id. 
149. Id. 
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voluntarily choose to do so.150 He agreed to pay an amount in excess 
of what was permitted under the USFSPA.151 Thus, the argument the 
husband made on appeal is an argument which he waived in prior 
court proceedings and by the entry of consent orders that were not 
appealed.152 In summary, the retired servicemember’s post-
retirement agreement to pay his former spouse a share of his military 
pension, together with the doctrine of res judicata, barred his later 
claim that he did not have to indemnify his former spouse for 
amounts waived for VA disability compensation. The Illinois Court 
of Appeals correctly affirmed.  
2. Bloom v. Bloom
Bloom v. Bloom,153 a Pennsylvania Superior Court case, was also 
decided shortly after the Howell decision. Like Winters, the Bloom 
opinion does not specifically refer to Howell, but it correctly applies 
the principles examined in Howell. Bloom is distinguishable from 
Howell because it involves an agreement incorporated in a judgment 
with language regarding “retirement pay from the U.S. Army” rather 
than disposable retired pay.154   
The parties divorced in 1992 (pre-Howell) and their settlement 
agreement was incorporated in a divorce decree.155 It provided the 
former wife with 50% of the retired former husband’s “retirement 
pay from the U.S. Army for as long as she lives.”156  About twenty 
years later, the former husband was declared completely disabled.157 
He qualified for tax-free CRSC,158 thus waiving the entirety of his 
disposable retired pay.159 Accordingly, the former wife’s payments 
ceased.160  
150. Id. 
 151. Id. (“A party can agree to pay more than is allowable under any statute. He 
cannot be forced to do so, but he can voluntarily choose to do so.”). 
152. Id. 
153. No. 1443 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 3225862 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 31, 2017). 
154. Id. at *6. 
155. Id. at *1. 
156. Id. at *4. 
157. Id. at *1. He had to resign from his high school teaching position. Id. 
158. 10 U.S.C. § 1413a (2012). 
159. Bloom, 2017 WL 3225862, at *1. 
160. Id. 
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The former wife filed a petition for enforcement, alleging that 
the cessation of payments violated their settlement agreement.161 
After a hearing on the matter, the court ordered the former husband 
to reinstitute payments to the former wife, as required by their 
divorce settlement agreement.162 The court reasoned that the 
election of CRSC in lieu of military retired pay amounted to “a 
‘unilateral and extrajudicial modification of the decree,’ depriving 
[wife] of the bargained-for benefits included in the divorce 
decree.”163 It further reasoned that “so long as the court’s order 
avoids specifying an ‘improper source of funds’ for payments to be 
made in conformity with the decree, there will be no violation of 
[Mansell].”164 
  On the husband’s appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to provide the wife with an equitable remedy.165 The court 
stated that the settlement agreement was intended to ensure the wife 
“receiv[ed] a share of [h]usband’s ‘retirement pay from the U.S. 
Army’” as opposed to disposable retirement pay.166 The court further 
reasoned that Mansell “does not stand for the proposition that the 
trial court must determine that a party can satisfy his contractual 
obligations, but only that such satisfaction cannot be attached 
directly to the party’s military disability pay.”167 
In summary, the retiree’s post-retirement agreement to pay his 
former wife a share of his military pension, together with the 
doctrine of res judicata, barred his later claim that he did not have 
to indemnify his former wife for amounts waived for CRSC. The 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania correctly affirmed. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 
164. Id. (citations omitted). “Hence, it concluded that Husband breached a 
valid contract when he unilaterally changed the source of his monthly benefits so 
that Wife no longer received her share of his retirement funds. The court 
determined that Wife was entitled to receive the benefit of the bargain, but 
refrained from attaching Wife’s payments to Husband’s CRSC benefits. Instead it 
ordered Husband to pay Wife the damages flowing from his breach of contract.” Id. 
165. Id. at *6. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. (“Although some courts have utilized alternative sources of income in 
rendering an equitable judgment, we find no language in Mansell which mandates 
such a finding.”). 
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3. Hurt v. Jones-Hurt and Stojka v. Stojka
Hurt v. Jones-Hurt,168 a Maryland Court of Special Appeals case, 
is the first case to recognize and interpret Howell. When the parties 
divorced in 2004, the trial court awarded the wife of a military retiree 
one-third of the marital share of the husband’s military pension.169 
The court was unaware that the husband had a 10% VA disability 
rating and was receiving VA disability compensation at the time of 
the divorce.170  
Some years later, the husband began drawing retired pay, and 
his VA disability rating had increased to 30%.171 Over the course of 
three different orders, the court ruled that the former wife was 
entitled to the same overall dollar amount for the retired 
servicemember’s military retired pay, notwithstanding the reduction 
for the VA waiver.172 Essentially, the court ordered that the husband 
“shall pay to [wife] the differential between the amount [wife] 
receives directly from the government . . . and the full amount of the 
pension she is entitled to receive pursuant to the divorce 
judgment.”173 Thus, absent a prior agreement or consent order, the 
court ordered the retired servicemember to indemnify his former 
wife for a reduction in her retired pay share due to a VA waiver—a 
prime example of adjudicated indemnification. The husband timely 
appealed.174 
The Howell decision was issued after oral arguments had been 
made in Hurt.175 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
incorrectly and unnecessarily asserted that Howell overruled the 
Maryland state precedent in support of indemnification.176 It should 
have found that Howell did not overrule prior Maryland 
168. 168 A.3d 992 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017). 
 169. Id. at 994. Although he was already retired from the Army National Guard, 
he would not begin to draw retired pay until the age of sixty. 10 U.S.C. § 12731(f)(1) 
(2012). 
170. Hurt, 168 A.3d at 994. 
171. Id. at 995. 
172. Id. at 994. 
173. Id. at 996. 
174. Id. at 997. 
175. Id. at 1001. 
176. Id. at 1002. 
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precedent—Allen,177 Dexter,178 and Wilson179—as the underlying facts 
were distinguishable in those cases. 
The court reasoned that the veteran’s choice to elect VA 
disability benefits overrode the court’s ability to amend the marital 
property award to reflect post-judgment changes in circumstances.180 
The court noted that “[a]lthough the circuit court could not have 
known this at the time, we now know that military retirement 
benefits are always contingent, whether or not the veteran has a 
disability rating at the time of divorce.”181 The court further noted 
that “[t]he possibility of a new disability rating is always out there, 
and parties and courts must account for (and attempt to predict the 
likelihood of) these contingencies when valuing military retirement 
pay.”182 
  In summary, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed 
the judgment of the circuit court and held that a judge could not 
order reimbursement/indemnification for a former spouse when 
the veteran’s VA disability rating (increased from 10% to 30%) 
diminished the former spouse’s share of military retired pay.183 
However, it is important to note that Hurt, like Howell, is not a 
contract case, as there was no agreement between the parties and no 
consent order.  Additionally, there was at least one prior un-appealed 
order.  
Stojka v. Stojka,184 another Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
case, further interprets Howell and Hurt. The issue presented in Stojka 
was whether the trial court erred by including language in the 
parties’ divorce judgment that indefinitely reserved jurisdiction over 
 177. Allen v. Allen, 941 A.2d 510, 516 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (stating that 
the term “pension/retirement plans” included “all retirement benefits accrued as a 
result of appellant’s military service”). 
 178. Dexter v. Dexter, 661 A.2d 171, 174–75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (finding 
that the parties reached an agreement regarding the division of one spouse’s 
military pension, and that agreement was read into the record and incorporated 
into their divorce judgment). 
 179. Wilson v. Wilson, 117 A.3d 138, 140 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (affirming 
a district court’s holding that a disabled military retiree breached the property 
settlement with his former wife when he did not increase her payment after his 
increased disability earnings). 




184. No. 1496, 2017 WL 5036322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 2, 2017). 
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the parties and their personal property if the former spouse’s share 
of the veteran’s military retired pay was reduced.185 Essentially, the 
trial court retained jurisdiction to modify the pension division 
payments in the event the former spouse’s share of the 
servicemember’s military retired pay was later reduced due to a VA 
waiver or for any other reason.186 Upon the servicemember’s timely 
appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals properly held that 
the portion of the judgment pertaining to indemnification for a VA 
waiver violated the USFSPA because the servicemember did not 
consent to it.187 Accordingly, the trial court was directed to strike the 
portion of the judgment “retaining jurisdiction to modify the 
pension division payments should [the servicemember] waive gross 
military retire[d] pay for VA disability compensation.”188 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals holding is consistent 
with Howell.189 However, the court properly distinguished Stojka from 
Howell and Hurt by noting that “the court contemplated the ability to 
maintain continuing jurisdiction to revisit the division of pension 
payments not only in the case of potential disability, but also if [the 
servicemember] saw a reduction in force or was not selected for 
promotion.”190 Thus, the appellate court did not declare that the 
trial court may not retain any jurisdiction over its judgment 
regarding the military pension; the court only restricted the 
retention of jurisdiction regarding indemnification.191  
4. Vlach v. Vlach
Vlach v. Vlach192 is a Tennessee Court of Appeals case that 
involved a 2002 (pre-Howell) final decree of divorce, which 
incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement.193 The 
agreement included a provision dividing the servicemember’s 
185. Id. at *1. 
186. Id. at *4. 
187. Id. at *8. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. The servicemember testified during trial that although he has over 
seventeen years of active duty military service, he may not attain the twenty years 
necessary to receive military retired pay. Id. at *2. 
191. Id. at *9. 
192. No. M2015-01569-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 4864991 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 
2017). 
193. Id. at *1. 
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military retired pay and considered that the servicemember’s receipt 
of disability benefits may affect his retired pay.194 The agreement 
specifically stated that it was the court’s “intention that if the [former 
spouse] receives a deduction from [the servicemember’s] military 
retirement pension, such as for an election of VA disability, then the 
percentage of the military retirement pension will be adjusted to 
equal the same dollar sum as if no disability or similar deduction was 
made.”195 Thus, it contained an indemnification clause. It was not 
appealed.  
The final decree of divorce was not sufficient to effectuate direct 
payments from the retired pay center, so the servicemember’s 
former wife sought a clarifying order.196 A clarifying order was 
granted, which awarded the former wife 26% of the veteran’s “total 
military retired pay.”197 The clarifying order further stated that, “[i]f 
[the retiree] becomes classified as 74% or more disabled, he may 
petition th[e] court for appropriate relief.”198 Shortly thereafter, the 
retiree received a VA disability rating of 100%.199 He petitioned the 
court for relief, but the court determined that he was not relieved of 
his obligation to pay his former wife 26% of his military retired 
pay.200 The retiree timely appealed.201 
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
the marital dissolution agreement included an indemnification 
provision.202 Indemnification was not applicable to this case, 
however, because the retiree’s 100% VA disability rating did not 
cause a reduction in his military retired pay because he was eligible 
for receipt of CRDP.203 However, the court incorrectly held that “the 
provision runs afoul of [Howell] and is unenforceable.”204 This is 
incorrect because the parties’ marital dissolution agreement was a 
contract that was entered into knowingly and voluntarily, and it was 
 194. Id. The marital dissolution agreement included a definition of “disposable 
retirement pension” that was contrary to the statutory definition. See id. at *6; see also 
10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
195. Vlach, 2017 WL 4864991, at *1. 
196. Id. 





202. Id. at *4. 
203. See 10 U.S.C. § 1414 (2008). 
204. Vlach, 2017 WL 4864991, at *5. 
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incorporated into the parties’ final decree of divorce, which was not 
appealed.205 Had indemnification been at issue in this case, contract 
law and res judicata would apply.206 Furthermore, there is nothing in 
Howell that suggests that the Supreme Court intended to invalidate, 
or otherwise render unenforceable, prior valid judgments.207  
In summary, the Tennessee Court of Appeals properly affirmed 
the judgement of the trial court, as modified to reflect that the 
former spouse’s share is a percentage of disposable retired pay 
rather than total retired pay.208 Nevertheless, the court incorrectly 
concluded that (pre-Howell) indemnification clauses are 
unenforceable.209  
5. Mattson v. Mattson
Minnesota was one of the first states to examine and apply the 
Howell decision. Mattson v. Mattson210 involved a stipulated divorce 
decree. The former spouse was to receive 40% of the veteran’s “gross 
monthly military retirement pay” and 40% of “the gross amount of 
[the veteran’s] military disability compensation” that he received 
from the VA.211 The decree was not appealed,212 which distinguishes 
this case from Howell. However, as in Howell, there was no underlying 
agreement or contract between the parties containing an express 
indemnification clause.213  
The veteran “made only sporadic payments on his obligations 
under the decree, resulting in substantial arrearages.”214 The former 
spouse sought enforcement, and the district court granted 
205. See id. at *1. 
 206. The court acknowledged that “[i]n order to understand the language used 
in the [marital dissolution agreement], one must understand federal law governing 
military retirement pay at the time the [marital dissolution agreement] was drafted.” 
Id. at *2. However, the court seemed to disregard this in their analysis. 
207. With great uniformity, case law around the country has held that McCarty 
and Mansell are not retroactive. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Applying 
Howell retroactively would create serious public policy implications. 
208. Vlach, 2017 WL 4864991, at *6. 
209. See id. at *4. 
210. 903 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
211. Id. at 236. 
212. Id. (stipulating that the issues on appeal are limited to the states authority 
to enforce division of military benefits and the awarding of attorney fees). 
 213. Id. at 243 (explaining that the court relied on Minnesota Statute section 
518.14, subdivision 1 as the basis for awarding the wife attorney fees and costs). 
214. Id. at 236. 
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relief—ordering the veteran to pay the military retired pay and 
disability compensation due pursuant to the stipulated divorce 
decree.215 The veteran subsequently appealed.216 The issue before 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals was whether federal law preempts 
enforcement of the parties’ stipulated decree dividing the veteran’s 
disability compensation.217  
When the court examined Gatfield and applied Howell, it failed 
to distinguish a key fact. Gatfield involved an express contractual 
indemnification clause, whereas Howell did not;218 the Howell case 
involved court adjudicated indemnification.219 Thus the court’s 
reasoning in Mattson, stated below, is flawed: 
In light of Howell, we conclude that our holding in Gatfield 
has been functionally overruled. In Gatfield, we held that 
principles of contract and res judicata could render a 
stipulated decree indemnifying an ex-spouse enforceable, 
even if it ran afoul of Mansell, because “parties are free to 
bind themselves to obligations that a court could not 
impose.” But, as clarified in Howell, such equitable 
compensation degrees do not escape federal preemption 
and are simply unenforceable.220 
The court failed to recognize that the decision in Howell is 
extremely narrow. The issue in Howell was the court’s post-divorce 
adjudication of indemnification when there was no underlying 
agreement or stipulation containing an express indemnification 
clause.221 Thus, Howell does not change the existing laws and 
precedent regarding express contract terms that are entered into 
voluntarily. Furthermore, the court should have applied the 
doctrine of res judicata, as the initial stipulated divorce decree was 
not appealed.  
The Minnesota Court of Appeals ultimately determined that 
“[f]ederal law preempts state courts from dividing a veteran’s military 




218. See Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1404 (2017); see also Gatfield v. 
Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632, 634–35 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). Likewise, there is no 
express contractual indemnification clause in Mattson. 
219. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1404. 
220. Mattson, 903 N.W.2d at 241 (citations omitted). 
221. Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1402. 
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divisions unenforceable, even if agreed upon.”222 But the public 
policy implications for such a determination are unclear, as “[i]t is 
difficult to see how federal interests are harmed to a greater degree 
when the owning spouse voluntarily consents to a contract dividing 
the benefits.”223 It is a common misconception that a veteran’s 
disability benefits are untouchable. In Rose v. Rose, the Supreme 
Court held that the federal preemption doctrine did not prohibit 
the state of Tennessee from holding a military veteran in contempt 
for nonpayment of child support.224 In that case, VA disability 
compensation was the veteran’s only means for satisfying his support 
obligation, notwithstanding the provision of federal law that VA 
benefits are not subject to attachment, levy, or seizure under Title 
38, U.S. Code, Section 5301(a)(1).225 
The issue regarding division of VA disability compensation was 
already decided in 1981 in Mansell.226 Mansell does not hold that parties 
are proscribed from contractually agreeing to divide military benefits 
that lay outside the USFSPA’s definition of disposable retired pay.227 
And neither does Mansell hold that res judicata should be ignored.228 
In fact, it holds the exact opposite.229  
The issues in Gatfield and Howell are completely different from 
the issue presented in Mattson. The chart below illustrates a summary 
of the underlying facts, issue(s), and holding in Gatfield, Howell, and 
Mattson. 
222. Mattson, 903 N.W.2d at 235. 
223. State Court Treatment, supra note 43, at 81. 
224. 481 U.S. 619, 636 (1987) 
225. Id. at 626–28. 
226. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 604 (1989). 
227. Id. at 583 (holding only that under the USFPA state courts may not treat 
“military retirement payment waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans’ 
disability benefits” as divisible property upon divorce). 
228. See supra Part II.C.1. 
229. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 586 n.5. 
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even if they 
were agreed 
upon. 
Parties should still be “free to bind themselves to obligations that 
a court could not impose.”230 Although Howell prevents a state court 
from adjudicating indemnification, Mattson is distinguishable, given 
that Howell did not involve a stipulation to divide disability 
compensation. Furthermore, Howell did not involve an express 
contractual indemnification clause, as was the case in Gatfield. In 
Mattson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals overreached in its analysis of 
Howell. 
D. Public Policy 
Since the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of court-
adjudicated indemnification, the only course of remedial action is 
through a legislative fix by Congress. Only an amendment to the 
USFSPA can change the Howell precedent.231 A large part of the 
battle with former-spouse military divorce issues is that Congress 
generally supports protections for military retirees, veterans, and 
servicemembers, whereas state law is typically what provides 
protections for former spouses.232 Congress does not enact family law 
230. Gatfield v. Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
231. See The Death of Indemnification, supra note 4. 
232. Email from Brett R. Turner, Senior Research Attorney, Nat’l Legal 
Research Grp., Inc. to Mark E. Sullivan, Principal Attorney, Sullivan & Tanner, P.A. 
(May 15, 2017, 12:54 EST) (on file with author). 
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legislation, it likely does not understand the intricacies of family law, 
and it “persistently undervalues family law policies, except when 
there is an occasional political uproar”—for example, the McCarty 
decision.233 McCarty caused a political uproar, which is why Congress 
enacted the USFSPA shortly thereafter. Since federal law trumps 
state law, Congress’s lack of familiarity with family law—specifically, 
the complex intricacies of military divorce—is a large and growing 
problem.234 The recent policy implications affect current and retired 
servicemembers, their former spouses, and attorneys. 
Plainly stated, “[t]he decision in the Howell case means that 
retirees may elect VA disability compensation ‘without a price tag,’ 
that is, without fear that a judge may later order a pay-back of moneys 
lost by the [retirees] former spouse because of a VA waiver.”235 It fully 
supports the servicemember’s side in military divorce cases, and 
provides nothing but positive policy implications for 
servicemembers.   
There are three recent policy changes that affect military 
divorce and negatively impact the former spouse. First, there is 
nothing in the Howell decision that benefits former spouses of 
military members. Previously, “an indemnification clause [was] the 
best preventive medicine to use in these cases.”236 Now, it is not likely 
that a servicemember or veteran will ever agree to one.237 Even 
without an indemnification clause, the majority of states had laws or 
precedent allowing a remedy.238 Howell essentially takes away this 
precedential protection. The precise remedies that may be available 
to a former spouse who ends up with a reduced share of military 
233. Id. 
234. See id. 
235. The Death of Indemnification, supra note 4. 
236. MILITARY DIVORCE HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 531. 
237. Knowing that Howell prevents a state court from adjudicating 
indemnification, the servicemember has little incentive to agree to indemnify their 
former spouse in the event of a VA waiver. See Allison A. Polchek, Recent Property 
Settlement Issues for Legal Assistance Attorneys, THE ARMY LAW., 4, 7 (1992) (“Although 
Mansell apparently would not prevent a service member and his or her spouse from 
agreeing to divide the service member’s gross retired pay, the decision leaves the 
service member with little incentive to do so. Knowing that Mansell will prevent a 
divorce court from dividing his or her gross retired pay, a service member probably 
will refuse to settle in hopes of protecting any assets the court cannot reach.”) 
238. See MILITARY DIVORCE HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 531–32. 
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retired pay due to a VA waiver are currently unknown,239 and the 
remedies that do arise will likely vary by state.240   
Second, section 641 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA 2017) 241 revised the USFSPA by 
changing the way MPDOs must be written and by redefining 
“disposable retired pay.”242 This new definition changed the amount 
of military retired pay that the government may pay directly to a 
former spouse.243 Essentially, going forward, the “disposable retired 
pay” is “the hypothetical retired pay attributable to the rank and 
years [or points] of service of the military member at the time of the 
divorce”—this is called the “Frozen Benefit Rule.”244 Under NDAA 
2017, in addition to the flat dollar, percentage, formula, or 
hypothetical award to the former spouse, the MPDO must contain 
the following data points: (1) the date of divorce;245 (2) the 
servicemember’s retired pay base as of the date of divorce;246 and (3) 
the servicemember’s creditable years of service (if active duty) or the 
servicemember’s creditable retirement points (if National Guard or 
Reserves) as of the date of divorce.247 This “Frozen Benefit Rule” only 
239. See The Death of Indemnification, supra note 4. 
240. Id. 
241. National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 641, 
130 Stat. 2000 (2016). The NDAA is a federal law that is passed consecutively every 
year since 1963. It specifies annual budget and expenditures and addresses the 
operations and business for the Department of Defense. 
242. Id. 
 243. National Defense Authorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 624, 131 
Stat. 1283 (2017) (further clarifying 10 U.S.C. § 1408); Mark E. Sullivan, Military 
Pension Division: The Frozen Benefit Rule, FED. BAR ASS’N VETERANS AND MIL. L. SEC. 3 
(2017), http://www.fedbar.org/Image-Library/Sections-and-Divisions/Veterans/ 
Tommy-Winter-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/4BAU-P4G8]. 
244. Id. The implementing regulations are found in the Department of Defense 
Financial Management Regulation (DODFMR). U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 25, 
at ch. 29. 
 245. This is problematic because some states do not permit or are strongly 
opposed to bifurcation of the divorce and the property division. See EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION, supra note 3, § 3.2 (providing a summary of arguments against 
bifurcation of the divorce and the property division with case citations for state 
appellate decisions). 
 246. For servicemembers entering military service after September 7, 1980, the 
retired pay base is the “high-36”—the average of the highest 36-months of basic pay. 
10 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). For servicemember’s entering military service before 
September 8, 1980, the retired pay base is the final basic pay. Id. § 1406. 
 247. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 25 at ch. 29, para. 290802; see also Mark E. 
Sullivan, Military Pension Division: The Frozen Benefit Rule, Part 2, FED. BAR ASS’N
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applies to the division of military retired pay of servicemembers who 
are not yet receiving retired pay (i.e., active-duty, National Guard, 
Reserves, gray area retirees).248 Regardless of the state’s date of 
classification,249 the “Frozen Benefit Rule” essentially freezes the 
former spouse’s share of military retired pay at the date of divorce.   
Third, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2016 (NDAA 2016)250 to modernize the retirement 
systems for the uniformed services.251 The NDAA 2016 created the 
Blended Retirement System, which went into effect on January 1, 
2018.252 Under this new retirement system, many retired pay 
decisions are unilaterally up to the servicemember, which could 
detrimentally impact the former spouse’s share of military retired 
pay.253 
E. Effect on Attorneys 
Military divorce is a complex and confusing area in family law, 
and thus a lawyer could easily make a serious error that could turn 
into a malpractice claim.254 Military divorce law represents a 
VETERANS AND MIL. L. SEC. 4 (2017), http://www.fedbar.org/Image-Library/ 
Sections-and-Divisions/Veterans/Tommy-Spring-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q 
HA6-DFW2]. 
248. See id. 
 249. The classification date is the marital cut-off date, which is the date the 
marriage terminated for marital/community property division purposes pursuant 
to state law. 
250. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, H.R. 1735, 114th 
Cong. (2015). 
 251. “Uniformed services” are the armed forces, the commissioned corps of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the commissioned corps of 
the Public Health Service. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5). 
 252. See Karen Jowers, Your Retirement: The Big Choice Nears, ARMY TIMES, Sept. 4–
11, 2017, at 22; Brentley Tanner, To Have and to Hold: Retirement Considerations in 
Military Divorce, ROLL CALL, (Military Law Comm., ABA Family Law Section, Chicago, 
Ill.), Spring 2016, at 11, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis 
trative/family_law/committees/rc_spring2016.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/7Y44-XQWY]; The Blended Retirement System Explained, MILITARY.COM, 
https://www.military.com/benefits/military-pay/blended-retirement-system.html   
[http://perma.cc/NE7P-P2VK] (last visited June 20, 2018). 
253. See Tanner, supra note 252, at 11, 14. 
 254. See Mark E. Sullivan, Fact or “Whacked”? Myths and Mistakes in Military 
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complicated fusion of state family law and several federal statues 
applicable only to military servicemembers.255 Some of the most 
common malpractice matters in family law are the improper drafting 
of pension division orders,256 omission of survivor annuities,257 and 
inadequate knowledge of a specific nature of the law.258 Put simply, 
“[t]he problem is that [attorneys] don’t know what they don’t know. 
And the law is ever-changing.”259 For example, attorneys are often 
unaware of the federal statutory requirements and deadlines 
pertaining to military retired pay, the SBP (the survivor annuity 
associated with military retired pay), and health care benefits and 
options.260 While it is an added upfront expense for either the 
attorney or the client, it is always a good idea to consult with an 
expert in the field, as it is easier and less costly to do things 
thoroughly and correctly the first time rather than having to correct 
an error later on.261 The expert does not have to be the attorney of 
record; he or she can simply associate as a consultant to assist solely 
with the military aspects of the divorce case.262  Sometimes, a Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) officer, a Guard or Reserve lawyer, or a 
 255. See Steven P. Shewmaker & Alexa N. Lewis, About Face—Congress Alters the 
Age Old Military Retirement System, ROLL CALL (Military Law Comm., A.B.A. Family 
Law Section, Chicago, Ill.), Spring 2016, at 7, https://www.americanbar.org/conte  
nt/dam/aba/administrative/family_law/committees/rc_spring2016.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y44-XQWY]; see, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1408.
256. Mark E. Sullivan & Kaitlin S. Kober, Malpractice and Military Divorce, 40 FAM. 
ADVOC. 38, 40 (2017). 
 257. GREGG M. HERMAN, ONE HUNDRED ONE PLUS PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE
FAMILY LAWYER 365 (2003). 
 258. Thomas J. Watson, Beware the Danger Signs: The Top Ten Family Law 
Malpractice Issues, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 6, 8, 11 (2017) (quoting Brian Anderson, Senior 
Claims Attorney at Wisconsin Lawyers Mutual Insurance Company). Mr. Watson 
recommends that practitioners hire an expert to draft a proper order for division 
of complex retirement plans and benefits. Id. at 3. Although a military pension is 
not a retirement plan, but rather a federal entitlement under Chapter 71 in Title 
10 of the United State Code, Mr. Watson’s recommendation is still applicable. 
 259. Id. at 11 (noting that it is “critical that lawyers stay on top of changes in the 
law”). 
260. See Myths and Mistakes, supra note 254. 
 261. See id.; Emily W. McBurney, Avoiding Legal Malpractice: Retirement Benefits and 
Qualified Domestic Relations Orders, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 22, 22 (2017) (addressing 
common mistakes that can lead to malpractice claims and stating that 
“[p]reparation on the front end can save you and your client a lot of time and 
money at the end of the case and keep you safe from claims of inadequate legal 
representation”). 
262. See Myths and Mistakes, supra note 254. 
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retired JAG officer can provide limited legal assistance. However, 
because JAG officers often do not “have the in-depth knowledge 
necessary for a serious case, they cannot go into court, and they 
usually have short-term assignments in legal assistance.”263 Attorneys 
should be aware that JAG officers often lack the exposure and 
expertise in the constantly changing realm of family law and military 
divorce.264 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under federal law, the divisible portion of military retired pay is 
limited to “disposable retired pay.”265 Essentially, this means that if a 
veteran receives VA disability compensation under Title 38 or 
Military Disability Retired Pay (MDRP) or CRSC under Chapter 61 
and Section 1413a of Title 10 respectively, a former spouse’s “share” 
of military retired pay could be substantially reduced or completely 
diminished. Until Howell, most states remedied this situation by 
applying the concept of indemnification.266 However, state courts 
are no longer allowed to adjudicate indemnification.267 Howell’s 
holding is narrow—federal law prevents a state court from 
adjudicating indemnification.268 There are two potential solutions to 
this problem. 
First, a solution may be to amend the USFSPA.269 In essence, the 
term “disposable retired pay” could be redefined to mean “military 
retired pay that the servicemember would be entitled to based only 
on the length of the servicemember’s creditable service” and 
eliminate the reduction for a VA waiver (i.e., eliminate 10 U.S.C. 
§ 1408(a)(4)(A)(ii)). For the sake of simplicity, this Note does not
address the implications of the SBP270 premium, nor does it go into 
263. Id. 
264. See id. 
265. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
266. State Court Treatment, supra note 43. 
267. See Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 1401 (2017). 
268. Id. at 1406 (“Regardless of their form, such reimbursement and 
indemnification orders displace the federal rule and stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the purposes and objectives of Congress. All such 
orders are thus pre-empted.”). 
269. 10 U.S.C. § 1408. 
 270. The SBP is the survivor annuity associated with military retired pay; it is 
governed by 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447–55. The SBP premium is deducted from gross retired 
pay when computing disposable retied pay under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A)(iv). See 
generally Ashley L. Oldham & Phillip J. Tucker, The Armed Forces Survivor Benefit Plan: 
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depth regarding the Frozen Benefit Rule,271 MDRP,272 and CRSC.273 
Redefining disposable retired pay poses significant public policy 
problems, as nobody wants to be seen as taking benefits away from 
veterans. 
Second, a potentially more favorable solution is to allow for 
concurrent receipt of military retired pay and VA disability 
compensation for all retirees, regardless of their VA disability rating. 
Currently, CRDP is only for retirees who have a VA disability rating 
of 50% or greater.274 Allowing CRDP for all retirees would eliminate 
the VA waivers. In other words, it would eliminate offsets to military 
retired pay when receipt of VA disability compensation is elected, 
and the retiree would receive his or her full military retired pay and 
full VA disability compensation. However, this resolution would not 
provide any relief to a former-spouse in situations in which a retiree 
is receiving MDRP275 or CRSC.276   
The Supreme Court has previously stated that res judicata is a 
defense to federal preemption regarding the division of military 
service benefits,277 and the Court has yet to address whether an 
agreement that divides a preempted benefit, such as a veteran’s 
disability benefits, is enforceable. Nevertheless, the United States 
Supreme Court decided in Howell that federal law prevents a state 
court from adjudicating indemnification. More specifically, Howell 
preempts state courts from ordering a retired servicemember to 
indemnify a former spouse for a reduction in the former spouse’s 
share of the retiree’s military retired pay when the retiree elects to 
receive VA disability compensation and an equal amount of military 
retired pay is waived. Instead, many state courts have misinterpreted 
Howell to be broader than it actually is. 
Can I Be a Beneficiary and Why Do I Care?, 29 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 149 (2016) 
(providing a “practical guide” to the SBP). 
271. Supra Part IV.D. 
272. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201–22. 
273. Id. § 1413a. 
274. Id. § 1414. 
275. Id. §§ 1201–22. 
276. Id. § 1413a. 
277. Supra Part II.B. 
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